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PROPERTY LAW

THIRD-PARTY LESSORS AND BAILORS BEWARE:
SOUTH CAROLINA DISTRAINT STATUTE

THREATENS DUE PROCESS
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Tolemac, Inc. v. United Trading,Inc.' the South Carolina Supreme Court

held that third-party property is subject to landlord distraint and implicitly
confirmed that section 27-39-250 of the South Carolina Code does not violate
substantive due process.2 Distraint is "[t]he inchoate right and interest which a
landlord has in the property of a tenant located on the demised premises."3 A
distraint proceeding begins when a landlord files an affidavit with the magistrate in
the district where the leased premises are located.4 The affidavit should state the
alleged amount of rent due and the time and place of the predistress hearing.5 A
predistress hearing is held to determine the validity of the landlord's distraint claim
and to assess the tenant's right to maintain possession of the property.' If the
landlord's claim is valid and the tenant fails to pay rent or post bond, the property
is sold at public auction.7
Section 27-39-250 directly addresses the presence of third-party property on
leased premises and provides that "[e]ven though property of the tenant must be first
applied to payment of the rent and costs, allproperty upon the rentedpremises is
subject to distress."' This language clearly allows distraint of third-party property
1. 326 S.C. 103, 484 S.E.2d 593 (1997).
2. Id. at 106, 484 S.E.2d at 595.
3. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 474 (6th ed. 1990).
4. See S.C. CODEANN. § 27-39-210 (Law. Co-op. 1991).
5. Id.
6. S.C. CODEANN. § 27-39-220 (Law. Co-op. 1991) ("The purpose of the predistress hearing is
to protect the tenant's use and possession ofproperty from arbitrary encroachment and to prevent unfair
or mistaken deprivation of property.").
7. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 27-39-310 to -320 (Law. Co-op. 1991).
8. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-39-250 (Law. Co-op. 1991) (emphasis added). The section reads as
follows:
If any property so distrained is not the property of the tenant, the tenant shall
immediately name the owner thereof and inform the officer of the ownership and
the officer shall distrain sufficient other property ofthe tenant to pay the rent and
costs. Even though property of the tenant must be first applied to payment of the
rent and costs, all property upon the rented premises is subject to distress as
herein provided, except property mentioned in § 27-39-230. If at any time prior
to sale as provided in § 27-39-320, the landlord is given or receives written notice
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when a delinquent tenant's property does not cover outstanding rent and costs.
Section 27-39-250 also provides procedural protection for third parties by requiring
notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the sale of distrained property. 9
However, the protection conferred by-the statute is limited and arguably violates the
due process rights of affected third parties.
This Note discusses the impact of Tolemac on the due process rights of thirdparty distrainees. Part II of this Note charts the evolution of South Carolina's
distraint statute and discusses the Tolemac decision. Part III begins a critical
analysis of the opposing viewpoints on distraint of third-party property and calls for
a legislative response. Part IV concludes the analysis and suggests other practical
alternatives to the South Carolina distraint statute.

II. BACKGROUND
A. The Evolution ofDistraint
The ancient remedy ofdistress originated in feudal England when barons began
discharging military service due from their vassals in exchange for rent on their
land.'" The penalty for non-payment of rent was forfeiture of the vassal's tenement;
however, the lord would often seize or distrain the tenant's chattels instead."I The
lord could hold the goods until he received payment.'2 Because the lord's right to
3
distrain was absolute, no consent from the tenant was needed.'
Today, the right to distrain property is generally conveyed by statute 4 and
"exists irrespective of whether distress is reserved in the lease contract." In South
Carolina, distraint first appeared in 1712 with the adoption ofa 1670 English statute
that allowed landlords to sell property seized from atenant to the highest bidder and
use the proceeds to satisfy the rent due.' 6 The General Assembly expressly
abolished the right of distraint in 1868,'" but resurrected it ten years later stating that
"no property shall be seized under a distress warrant for rent except such as belongs
to the tenant in his own right."'" The distraint statute remained largely the same until

containing facts substantiating ownership that some of the distrained property is
owned by a third party, the third party must receive notice, as provided in § 2739-210, and an opportunity to be heard, as provided in § 27-39-220, before the
distrained property of the third party is subject to sale pursuant to § 27-39-320.
Id.
9. Id.
10. JOHN EMERsON BENNETT, LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT § 157, at 238 n.a (1939).
11. Id.
12. Id.

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 238.
Id. at239.
Id.
Act of Dec. 12, 1712, No. 322,2 S.C. Stat. 401, 530 (adopting a series of English statutes).
Act of Sept. 24, 1868, No. 52, § 20, 14 S.C. Stat. 102, 106.
Act ofMar. 18, 1878, No. 474, 16 S.C. Stat. 511,511.
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1946 when the property "in his own right" language was deleted and replaced with
"all property upon the rented premises shall be subject to distress."' 9
In 1976 the General Assembly enacted section 27-39-250,2o which was virtually
identical to its predecessor, section 41-154.21 In 1984 U.S. District Judge Clyde
Hamilton found that section 27-39-250 violated procedural due process.' In
response, the General Assembly amended the section to include notice and hearing
provisions for third parties.' The South Carolina distraint statute has not changed
since that amendment.
B. Tolemac, Inc. v. United Trading, Inc.
In Tolemac a landlord commenced an action for collection of past due rent by
distraint.24 Tolemac, Inc., as the landlord, subleased a warehouse in York County,
South Carolina, to United Trading, Inc.2' The tenant defaulted on its rental
payments. 26 The presiding judge for the Sixteenth Circuit issued a Notice of
Predistress Hearing instructing all interested parties27 to appear before the Masterin-Equity for York County for a hearing on September 15, 1993, to "[show] why
[their] property on the premises should not be seized in order to satisfy the debt
owed to plaintiff for rent.' 2 TRP Cotton, Inc. filed a motion for release of its
personal property alleging ownership of certain property under distraint by the
landlord.29
TRP and other interested parties appeared at the predistress hearing to defend
their property rights." Tolemac's motion to distrain and TRP's motion for release
of personal property were argued, and the Master listened to the testimony of
several witnesses." TRP argued that "(1) a landlord has no right to distrain
property" owned by third parties and (2) a statute that permits distraint ofthird-party
property violates substantive due process. 2 TRP established itself as the owner of

19. Act of Apr. 3, 1946, No. 873, 1946 S.C. Acts 2584,2589. (codified at S.C. CODEANN. § 41154 (Michie 1952) (superseded by S.C. CoDEANNm. § 27-39-250 (Law. Co-op. 1991)).

20. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-39-250 (Law. Co-op. 1991).
21. S.C. CODEANN. § 41-154 (Michie 1962) (superseded by S.C. CODEANN.

§ 27-39-250 (Law.

Co-op. 1991).
22. Pettigrew v. Womble, 589 F. Supp. 242, 250 (D.S.C. 1984).
23. Act of May 13, 1985, No. 85, 1985 S:C. Acts 194, 195 (codified at S.C. CoDEANN. § 27-39250 (Law. Co-op. 1991)).
24. Tolemac, Inc. v. United Trading, Inc., 326 S.C. 103, 104, 484 S.E.2d 593, 594 (1997).

25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Interested parties included the sublessees and all other parties that may have had an ownership or security interest in the subject property. Record on Appeal at 9.

28. Id.
29. Id. at 30-31.
30. Id. at3.
31. Id. at4.
32. Tolemac, Inc. v. United Trading, Inc., 326 S.C. 103, 105, 484 S.E.2d 593, 594 (1997).
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record of a cotton bale press located on the premises that TRP had leased to Cotton
Traders International, Inc.33 Accordingly, the Master issued an Order which held
that "title to [the bale press] is vested in TPR [sic] Cotton, Inc.,"' and that "TPR
[sic] Cotton, Inc.... [is] entitled to immediate possession of [its] property." '
The Master based his ruling on the 1966 case of Frady v. Smith." According
to Frady,the landlord's right "to distrain is subject to the following conditions: (1)
distress must be for rent only; (2) when the relation of landlord and tenant exists;
(3) when the rent reserved is certain; (4) when the rent is in arrears; and (5) when
the property belongs to the tenant in his own right."3' Clearly, Tolemac did not
satisfy the final condition as neither sublessee owned the property "in his own
right." While the Master empathized with Tolemac's argument that Frady was
decided prior to the present statute, he noted that "the language in Section 27-39250 is almost identical to the previous Statutes which were in effect at the time of
the Frady decision."" Basing his decision solely on statutory construction and
Frady,the Master never reached the constitutional questions raised by TRP. 9 In
response to the Master's ruling, Tolemac filed a motion to reconsider. 0 The court
denied the motion, 4 ' and Tolemac appealed.42 Subsequently, the tenant filed a
Chapter 7 petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of South
Carolina. 3 The bankruptcy court invoked an automatic stay pursuant to § 362(a) of
the Bankruptcy Code on any proceedings concerning the tenant until February 1,
1996."
The South Carolina Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Moore,
held that section 27-39-250 enables a landlord to distrain third-party property." The
court emphasized that "[t]he master based his construction of § 27-39-250 on dicta
from Frady v. Smith... , which states that distraint is proper only 'when the
property belongs to the tenant in his own right.' 6 In distinguishing Frady, the
court noted that Fradyinvolved "earlier case law interpreting a statutory scheme"
that limited a landlord's right of distraint to property belonging to the tenant in his
own right.4' Although the court did not explicitly state that section 27-39-250

33. Record on Appeal at 64-65.
34. Id. at 4.
35. Id. at 6.
36. 247 S.C. 353, 147 S.E.2d 412 (1966).
37. Id. at 357, 147 S.E.2d at 414 (emphasis added).
38. Record on Appeal at 6.
39. Id. at 3-6.
40. Id. at 36-38.
41. Id. at 7.
42. Tolemac, Inc. v. United Trading, Inc., 326 S.C. 103, 105, 484 S.E.2d 593, 594 (1997).
43. Final Brief of Appellant at 3.
44. Final Brief of Respondent at 3-4.
45. Tolemac, 326 S.C. at 106,484 S.E.2d at 595.
46. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Frady v. Smith, 247 S.C. 353, 357, 147 S.E.2d 412, 414
(1966)).
47. Id. (footnote omitted).
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol49/iss5/14
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passed constitutional muster, Justice Moore asserted that "the statute currently
provides that notice and an opportunity to be heard is required 'before the distrained
property of the third party is subject to sale."'"8 Thus, the court implicitly affirmed
that the amended statute did not violate procedural due process.49 Although the
court may have implicitly addressed the procedural due process issue, it did not
address the argument that the statute violates the substantive due process rights of
third parties.
III. ANALYSIS

A citizen's right to due process from the states derives from the Fourteenth
Amendment, which in relevant part provides that "[n]o State shall make or enforce
any law which shall.., deprive any person of life, liberty, orproperty,without due
process of law."' The right to due process has two components: procedural due
process and substantive due process. Procedural due process protects a person's
right to notice and a right to be heard when an adjudication affecting a person's
right to life, liberty, or property is initiated.5" Substantive due process requires state
action to be fair and reasonable in content and application and not merely arbitrary
or capricious." In Pellev. Diners Club53 a Florida appellate court asserted that "[i]t
is fundamental that the constitutional guarantee of due process, which extends into
every proceeding, requires that the opportunity to be heard be full and fair, not
merely colorable or illusive.

The Fradylanguage relied upon by the Master-in-Equity was taken from Burnettv. Boukedes,240
S.C. 144,125 S.E.2d 10 (1962), which in turn relied upon Fidelity Trust & Mortgage Co. v. Davis, 158
S.C. 400, 155 S.E. 622 (1930). Davis involved section 5285 of the 1922 South Carolina Code, which
expressly prohibited distraint of third-party property. Davis, 158 S.C. at 407, 155 S.E. at 625. In
essence, the Fradycourt merely reproduced parts ofprior opinions without taking into account the 1946
amendments allowing third-party distraint.
48. Tolemac, 326 S.C. at 106,484 S.E.2d at 595 (quoting S.C. CODEANN. § 27-39-250 (Law.
Co-op. 1991)).
49. Prior to the 1985 amendment to section 27-39-250 of the South Carolina Code, the United
States District Court for the District of South Carolina found that section 27-39-250 violated the
procedural due process rights of third parties because it did not provide adequate notice or hearing
provisions. Pettigrew v. Womble, 589 F. Supp. 242,250 (D.S.C. 1984); see also infranotes 59-64 and
accompanying text. Because the South Carolina Supreme Court did not specifically find the amendment
unconstitutional, the court implicitly approved the notice and hearing provisions.
50. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
51. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). In Fuentespurchasers of household goods challenged

the constitutionality of Florida and Pennsylvania replevin statutes allowing seizure of property without
a prior hearing. Id. at 71. The Court held the prehearing seizure unconstitutional. Id. at 96.
52. SeeJeffriesv. Turkey Run Consol. Sch. Dist., 492 F.2d 1, 3-4(7th Cir. 1974) ("'[S]ubstantive
due process' means... that state action which deprives [a person] of life, liberty, or property musthave
a rational basis-that is to say, the reason for the deprivation may not be so inadequate that the
judiciary will characterize it as 'arbitrary.").
53. 287 So. 2d 737 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
54. Id. at 738.
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The Parties'Arguments

The South Carolina Supreme Court's holding in Tolemac essentially renders
the predistress hearing illusory and meaningless. Although, TRP was given an
opportunity to be heard, it never had an opportunity to change the outcome of the
proceeding. TRP's appearance at the predistress hearing was nominal because it
could do nothing to stop the sale of its property. Under the court's interpretation of
section 27-39-250, a hearing is required by law, but innocent third parties have no
meaningful remedies at that hearing.

Tolemac argued in its Final Reply Brief that third parties can "raise any
defenses which the tenant might have against the landlord for the unpaid rent" and
that third-party creditors with a perfected security interest can establish priority.55
While this may protect secured creditors, the rights afforded tenants do not grant
innocent third parties any protection. Tenants may only argue either that no rent is
due or that the amount is overstated. During the proceedings before the Master,
counsel for Tolemac was asked whether a third party's appearance at the hearing
could have any bearing on the disposition of its property.56 The Master was troubled
by the illusory nature of the hearing and concluded that, under Tolemac's
interpretation of the statute, a third party's property would be distrained and sold
regardless of whether or not the party appeared at the predistress hearing."
While Tolemac argued on appeal that one ofthe purposes of the hearing is "to
determine whether there is a mortgage debt or security interest which must be
satisfied before the distrained property is subject to sale,"58 this argument does not
account for the innocent bailor or lessor who merely fails to perfect a security
interest. For example, in Pettigrewv. Womble59 the United States District Court for
the District of South Carolina found that section 27-39-250 of the South Carolina
Code, as then written, was unconstitutional because "it denie[d] a third party who
own[ed] property found on the tenant's premises any notice or opportunity to be
heard whatsoever, either prior [to] or subsequent [to] the actual seizure. 60 In
Pettigrew a landlord attempted to sell a stereo that had been seized pursuant to a
distress warrant.6 ' The stereo had been loaned to the tenant by his sister.62 The sister
came forward with proof of ownership, but the court denied return of her property.63
The court asserted that the statute did not "provide at any time a right for a third
party to be heard as to its ownership rights."' The third party in Pettigrewwas an

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Final Reply Brief of Appellant at 14.
Record on Appeal at 84-85.
Id. at 84.
Final Reply Brief of Appellant at 14.
589 F. Supp. 242 (D.S.C. 1984).
Id. at 250.

61. Id. at 245-46.
62. Id. at 245.
63. Id. at 245-46.
64. Id. at 249.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol49/iss5/14
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innocent third-party bailor who did not file a security interest. Even under the
current distraint statute that provides third parties with notice and an opportunity to
be heard, the tenant's sister in Pettigrewwould still have lost her property under the
supreme court's holding in Tolemac because of the illusory nature of the hearing.
Although several courts have declared distraint statutes unconstitutional
because they authorize seizure of property without a hearing," the Pettigrewcourt
noted that "its research revealed no decisions holding third party distraint violative
of substantive due process."66 Several reasons may explain this lack of case law.
First, the issue is novel and no third party may have challenged the substantive
nature of a predistress hearing. Second, as in Pettigrew and Tolemac, courts may
have never reached the substantive arguments because the courts decided the cases
on other grounds. Finally, predistress hearings in otherjurisdictions may allow third
parties to recover their property upon conclusive proof of ownership.67 Although the
Pettigrew court could not find a case holding third-party distraint unconstitutional,
neither Tolemac nor the supreme court cited any case which specifically held that
a predistress hearing depriving a third party of its property was constitutional." The
South Carolina Supreme Court had the occasion to render final judgment on the
merits, but instead decided the issue on narrower grounds.69
Tolemac argued on appeal that a 1985 amendment70 to section 27-39-250
answered all questions raised by Pettigrew,as the amendment addressed the specific
problems of the statute. The Pettigrew court noted that "[h]aving held the statute
unconstitutional on the ground of procedural due process, the court need not reach
the equal protection or substantive due process arguments asserted by the plaintiff,
[or] the claim made under Article I Section 13 of the South Carolina
Constitution."'" These same constitutional issues were raised by TRP at trial and on
appeal, but were never addressed by the Tolemac court.72 In 1985, the General
Assembly addressed the procedural problems of distraint proceedings by amending
section 27-39-250 to include notice and hearing provisions for third parties.73
However, it is unclear whether the procedural safeguards enacted by the General

65. E.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337
(1969); Van Ness Indus. v. Claremont Painting & Decorating Co., 324 A.2d 102 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.

Div. 1974).
66. Pettigrew,589 F. Supp. at 250 n.7.
67. For example, Florida allows a third party to sue to recover property distrained by a landlord.
FLA. STAT. ANN.

§ 83.15 (West 1987).

68. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
69. See Tolemac, Inc. v. United Trading, Inc., 326 S.C.103, 106, 484 S.E.2d 593, 595 (1997)
(holding that the plain language of section 27-39-250 of the South Carolina Code allows distraint of

third-party property).
70. Act of May 13,1985, No. 85, 1985 S.C. Acts 194, 195 (codified at S.C. CODEANN. § 27-39250 (Law. Co-op. 1991)).
71. Pettigrew, 589 F. Supp. at 250 n.7.
72. See Final Brief of Respondent at 15-20.
73. Act ofMay 13, 1985, No. 85, 1985 S.C. Acts 194, 195 (codified at S.C. CODEANN. § 27-39250 (Law. Co-op. 1991)).
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Assembly materially cure any defects in substantive due process.
If the provisions of section 27-39-250 do not allow third parties a reasonable,
meaningful opportunity to voice their claims, then the statute violates substantive
due process by refusing rightful owners an opportunity to claim their property. As
Judge David Norton ofthe U.S. District Court in the District of South Carolina has
noted:
Substantive due process demands that the law shall not be unreasonable,
arbitrary, or capricious, and that the means selected shall have some
relation to the object sought to be attained. In other words, a deprivation
of life, liberty, or property is constitutionally supportable only if the
conduct from which the deprivation flows is proscribed by reasonable
legislation reasonably applied.74
The purpose of the South Carolina distraint statute is to aid a landlord in the
collection of past-due rent.7" Accordingly, a distraint statute that allows the seizure
of a tenant's property for unpaid rent is rationally related to that purpose and is,
therefore, constitutional. In amending section 27-39-250, the South Carolina

General Assembly apparently sought to remedy the due process problems raised by

Pettigrew.76 However, the distraint statute may still violate substantive due process
if the right to a predistress hearing is illusory.
As counsel for TRP argued in its brief on appeal, "[A] statute which permits a
landlord to seize third-party property in satisfaction of a tenant's unpaid rent bears
no rational relationship to the statute's intended purpose, and is overly broad in its
application."77 Taking property definitively determined to be owned by a third party
does not comport with the purpose of collecting past-due rent because the third
party and the landlord have no contractual relationship. The statute is overinclusive
in its application because it extends the rights of the landlord beyond the bounds of
privity.
B. The Allocation of Burdens
The taking ofathird-party's property amounts to a windfall forthe landlord and
an unreasonable burden for the true owner. Landlords may argue that they are not
receiving a windfall because they are only receiving money owed to them.
However, this argument fails to take into account the allocation of risk at the time
of the rental agreement. The rental agreement was between the landlord and the
tenant, not between the landlord and innocent third parties. The third party has no
74. McMahan v. International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural &Ornamental Iron Workers, 858 F.
Supp. 529, 547-548 (D.S.C. 1994) (citation omitted).
75. Burnett v. Boukedes, 240 S.C. 144, 153, 125 S.E.2d 10, 14-15 (1962).
76. See supranotes 22-23 and accompanying text.
77. Final Brief of Respondent at 19-20.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol49/iss5/14
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way to assure payment of rent by the tenant and cannot protect its property from a
landlord's taking. A landlord should not be able to profit from the mere fortitude of
finding a third party's property on the premises.
The Tolemac decision imposes a duty on third-party lessors and bailors to
monitor tenants. The burden of monitoring placed upon innocent third parties
surpasses the burden on landlords to relinquish property upon proof of ownership.
For example, to ensure its property is protected, a third-party bailor must continually
observe the rental status of a tenant. In contrast, the landlord would simply have to
turn over property mistakenly seized in distraint. Although the original motivation
for allowing distraint of all goods found on the premises was to prevent "fraud
which might be perpetrated by the tenant," ' proof of ownership alleviates this
problem. While landlords should be free from the burden of proving that the
distrained goods found on the premises belong to the tenant, they should be required
to return property that is conclusively proven to be that of a third party.
Landlords may argue that third-party bailors should secure a remedy from the
lessee who negligently subjected their property to distraint. However, a lessee
unable to pay rent will also be unable to reimburse the third party for the distrained
property. In addition, an innocent third-party bailor must expend time and money
to retrieve its own property. Alternatively, the landlord would incur very little extra
expense, if at all, in determining ownership of the property because the statute
already mandates a predistress hearing. As a result, the most efficient and just
remedy is for landlords to return any property that rightfully belongs to innocent
third-party bailors.
C. DistraintStatutes
States are divided on the issue of distraint. Currently, at least twenty-six states
do not have provisions for distress or have expressly abolished distress for certain
kinds of leases.79 Seven of these states have abolished distress for rent completely, 0
and five have abolished distress for residential tenancies."1 While this trend does not
address the issue of third-party distraint, it indicates that many states disfavor
distraint as a remedy for landlords. Additionally, both the Uniform Residential

78. 49 AM. JUR. 2D Landlordand Tenant § 984 (1995).
79. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.250 (Michie 1996) (expressly abolishing distraint); DEL.

CODE ANN. tit.
25, § 6301 (1989) (abolishing distraint inresidential leases).
80. ALAKA STAT. § 34.03.250 (Michie 1996); Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-1372(B) (West
1990); CONN. GEN STAT. ANN. § 47a-4(a)(6) (West 1958); IOWA CODE ANN. § 562A.31(2) (West
1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2567(b) (1994); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 504.01 (West 1990); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 704.11 (West 1981). For a complete list of states abolishing distraint, see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 12.1, stat. note 5 (1977).
81. DEL. CODEANN. tit. 25, § 6301(a) (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 713.691(3) (West 1988); NEB.
REv. STAT. § 76-1434(2) (1996), OR. REv. STAT. § 98.420 (1990); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 59.18.230(4) (West 1990).
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Landlord and Tenant Acte2 and the tentative draft of the Model Residential
Landlord-Tenant Code' also expressly abolish distraint." Critics insist that distraint
endures only as a "feudal prerogative, adopted when no rights amounted to much
of anything except those of the owner of the land, and when personal property was
not so much prized as at present."85 Nevertheless, this feudal relic still exists in
South Carolina.
D. A Legislative Proposal
The South Carolina General Assembly should amend the current law to include
an innocent, third-party owner exception to protect the substantive due process
rights of third parties. While this provision may be a novel solution to the thirdparty distraint debate, it furnishes a middle ground between the two extremes of
abolishing distraint and allowing the wrongful taking of third-party property. The
General Assembly can draw from previously enacted laws protecting innocent
owners of property seized in drug forfeitures.86 In such situations, courts have the
discretion to return seized property if the owner proves by a preponderance of the
evidence that the owner did not consent to, or have knowledge of, the property
being used for illegal purposes.87 In Ducworth v. Neely)8 the South Carolina Court
of Appeals held that a standard of actual knowledge must be used to determine
whether an owner knew or consented to the illegal activity. 9 The General Assembly
could apply similar reasoning to property seized in distraint by requiring the thirdparty owner to conclusively prove ownership by a preponderance of the evidence.
Ownership could be established by providing the court with a receipt, bill of sale,
or lease agreement. Although a conclusive ownership standard would not protect
all innocent bailors, it would allow some recourse for rightful owners without
abridging the rights of landlords.
Landlords may argue that an innocent owner provision would encourage fraud
by tenants; however, the benefits of such a provision would outweigh any
detrimental effect to the landlord. Even with the implementation of an innocent

82. UNIF. RFSIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANTACT § 4.205(b), 7B U.L.A. 497 (1985).
83. See MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE § 3-403 (Tentative Draft 1969).
84. ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.55, at 368-69 (1984).
85. Annotation, Goods Owned by Strangeror Subject to an Encumbrance in His Favor as
Subject to DistraintforRent, 62 A.L.R. 1106, 1107 (1929).
86. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-586(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997). This statute allows an
innocent owner to "apply to the court... for the return of any item seized under the [forfeiture]
provisions." Id.
87. Id. § 44-53-586(b)(1).
88. 319 S.C. 158, 459 S.E.2d 896 (Ct. App. 1995).
89. Id. at 165, 459 S.E.2d at 900. The trial court in Ducworth found that the owners of a store
who had unknowingly leased the store to drug dealers were not innocent owners because they should
have known of the drug activity near the store. Id. at 159, 459 S.E.2d at 897. The appellate court
remanded with instructions to apply the actual knowledge standard. Id. at 165, 459 S.E.2d at 900.
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owner provision, the landlord would still receive a windfall from third-party
property owners that cannot conclusively prove ownership. The rights of innocent
bailors and lessors should be no less protected than the rights of persons that rent
or loan property to drug dealers. The South Carolina General Assembly has a duty
to protect the Fourteenth Amendment right ofsubstantive due process by amending
the distraint statute to include an innocent owner provision.
IV. CONCLUSION
The South Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Tolemac infringes upon the
substantive due process rights of third-party bailors because the procedural
safeguards endorsed by the court are illusory and fictional. The predistress hearing
granted by section 27-39-250 of the South Carolina Code does not adequately
protect the substantive rights of third parties because it does not furnish them with
a meaningful prospect of affecting the outcome of the proceeding. The statute is
"unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious,"' overly broad in its scope, and not rationally
related to its intended purpose. Furthermore, the decision results in a windfall to the
landlord and imposes a burden upon third-party property owners to monitor the
lessee's rental status.
At the very least, South Carolina should protect the rights of innocent thirdparty distrainees through an innocent owner provision. This would allow the courts
equitable discretion to mitigate the harsh effect on third parties by returning goods
to those that can conclusively prove ownership. Alternatively, South Carolina could
join the ranks of those states that completely ban distraint as a remedy or ban it in
the context ofresidential landlord-tenant relationships. Whatever the remedy for its
harsh results, South Carolina should seek a solution to the current distraint statute
to cure its procedural defects.

PaulE. Hammack

90. McMahan v. International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, 858 F.
Supp. 529, 547 (D.S.C. 1994).
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